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It was the Law of the Sea, they said. Civilization ends at the waterline.  
Beyond that, we all enter the food chain, and not always right at the top. 
Hunter S. Thompson 
  
6 
CONTENTS
SCIENTIFIC ENVIRONMENT.................................................................... 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................... 3 
CONTENTS ..................................................................................................... 5 
LIST OF PAPERS........................................................................................... 7 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................... 8 
THE ECONOMICS OF FISHING.............................................................. 11 
FISH – A NATURAL RESOURCE ............................................................ 11 
EVOLUTION OF FISHERIES ECONOMICS........................................... 12 
CURRENT STATUS AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE ................ 14 
ALTERNATIVE USES AND ECOSYSTEM BENEFITS......................... 17 
THE BIOLOGY BEHIND ECONOMICS ................................................. 18 
FISH STOCKS AS BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS.......................................... 18 
IMPACT OF FISHING ............................................................................... 18 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS........................................................... 20 
BIOECONOMIC SYNTHESIS ................................................................... 23 
THESIS APPROACH................................................................................... 24 
RESEARCH RATIONALE ........................................................................ 24 
THE VALUE OF SIZE................................................................................ 24 
THE COST OF EVOLUTION .................................................................... 26 
REFERENCE LIST ...................................................................................... 29 
PAPER I ......................................................................................................... 41 
PAPER II........................................................................................................ 69 
PAPER III ...................................................................................................... 93 
PAPER IV .................................................................................................... 109
  
7
LIST OF PAPERS 
PAPER I 
Zimmermann F., Heino M., and Steinshamn S. (2011) 
Does size matter? A bioeconomic perspective on optimal harvesting when price is 
size-dependent. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences (in press)
PAPER II 
Zimmermann F., Steinshamn S., and Heino M. (2011) 
Optimal harvest feedback rule accounting for the fishing-up effect and size-
dependent pricing. Natural Resource Modeling (in press)
PAPER III 
Zimmermann F., and Heino M. 
Size-dependent pricing in Norwegian fisheries. Manuscript 
PAPER IV 
Zimmermann F., and Jørgensen C. 
The bioeconomic consequences of fishing-induced evolution: A model predicts 
limited impact on net present value. Manuscript
  
8 
ABSTRACT
The influence of fishing on the dynamics of fish stocks is a core element in 
fisheries management. One of the most notable characteristics in this context is the size-
structure of a fish stock, composed by the individual and its body size. From a biological 
perspective, individual size is directly linked to most relevant life-history traits like 
growth, maturation or reproductive output, connecting it to evolutionary processes. In 
the context of fisheries, individual fish constitute the harvested biomass and therefore its 
overall value. In addition, individual size possesses an intrinsic economic value: 
Commonly, bigger fish are more valuable than smaller ones and fetch higher prices per 
weight unit. Thus, size-dependent pricing underlines in economic terms the relevance of 
individual size, and suggests at the same time an interaction with demographic shifts 
through fishing. Generally, policies accounting for individual growth and size structure 
can improve yield and economic returns, therefore an interactive influence of size-
dependent pricing on optimal harvest strategies is likely. Similarly, to take into account 
the impact of potential evolutionary changes in stock composition through fishing could 
improve the long-term economic benefits from fisheries. 
In paper I and II, the influence of size-dependent pricing on optimal harvest 
strategies is evaluated. Positive relationships between individual sizes of fish and the 
prices per weight unit fishermen receive are widespread in commercial fisheries. This 
underlying hypothesis is evaluated in Paper III with a statistical analysis of price data 
from Norwegian fisheries. Furthermore it is commonly assumed that such size-dependent 
pricing can influence the optimal catch composition maximizing economic rent. This 
raises the question whether the impact on optimal harvest strategies and corresponding 
maximum economic yield is of significant magnitude, and hence should be considered in 
management decisions. Paper I addresses this issue with age-structured models 
parameterized for two pelagic fisheries in Norway, targeting Atlantic herring (Clupea 
harengus) and Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus). Here positive size-dependent 
pricing results in lower optimal harvest, higher average catch size and influences net 
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present value. On the other hand, paper II provides an analytical approach, introducing 
size effects into a generic Gordon-Schaefer type model. The assumption of a negative 
relationship between fishing effort and average individual size emulates a fishing-
induced truncation of size structure, while mean catch size is positively related to price to 
account for size-dependent pricing. This allows for tracing how such size-dependent 
effects change the patterns of optimal harvest paths and sustainable revenue in fish 
stocks. The results show a decrease of optimal effort and harvest with increasing strength 
of size effects. Therefore, Paper I and II suggest that ignoring the impact of fishing on 
size structure of fish stocks as well as size-dependent pricing could result in suboptimal 
management strategies and rent dissipation. Paper III underlines this conclusion and 
demonstrates that size-dependent pricing is indeed relevant in Norwegian fisheries.
In Paper IV, a simplified evolutionary life-history model was utilized to explore 
potential economic consequences of fishing-induced evolutionary changes. The 
underlying assumption is based on evidences that harvesting of fish stocks changes 
survival probabilities and therefore selection landscape for life-history strategies, 
resulting in adaptations of corresponding traits like maturation age. Hence, the model 
focuses on age at maturation as basis of stock dynamics for a cod-like species, while 
fishing is described by fishing mortality and size selectivity. Combined, these parameters 
determine the resulting yield and net revenue of the simulated fishery. A comparison of 
this model with a non-evolutionary version allows for an impact analysis of harvest 
strategies on life history evolution and the long-run economic consequences. The results 
predict an influence of fishing-induced evolution on stock biomass and composition as 
well as yield and economic rent. However, the quantitative impact is marginal even 
under low discount rates and the consequences for optimal harvest patterns moderate. 
Negative economic consequences are present for stocks managed within the range of 
maximum economic yield, while evolutionary adaptation provides beneficial resilience 
towards high fishing pressure. Nevertheless, under consideration of fishing-induced 
evolution fishing mortalities maximizing economic rent remain nearly the same for most 
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parameter values, implying that optimal harvest strategies are not significantly affected 
by an evolutionary component. Additionally, the results show high sensitivity to 
discounting: Increasing discount rates render the influence of fishing-induced evolution 
irrelevant even on the level of low to moderate discount rates. This highlights the 
problematic effect of discount rates in long-term cost-benefit calculations, and calls for a 
careful use of discounting in view of small but detrimental changes over long time 
periods. 
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THE ECONOMICS OF FISHING 
 
FISH – A NATURAL RESOURCE 
Aquatic organisms are one of the world’s pivotal renewable resources, providing food, 
employment and other benefits on a global scale. Most prominent are commercial 
fisheries and aquaculture with a total production volume of 145.1 million tones in 2009 
(FAO 2011), whereof marine fisheries contribute the main part (55%) with a stable 
production. Aquaculture has become increasingly important, now accounting for 38% of 
the total volume, while inland fisheries remain a minor factor (7%). Fisheries and 
aquaculture provide direct or indirect livelihoods for estimated 540 million people, and 
human consumption represents the primary utilization (81%), resulting in all-time high 
of 17.2 kg per capita annual fish supply in 2009. Correspondingly, fish contributed 
15.7% to the global population’s intake of animal protein in 2007 (FAO 2011).  
Fish is a particularly important food source in developing countries, therefore a 
key component for future food security in view of population growth and environmental 
threats (Kent 1997, Garcia and Rosenberg 2010). However, the progression from 
artisanal to industrial fishing resulted in four-fold increase of total catch over the second 
half of last century, threatening fish as a future resource (Pauly et al. 2002). Today, 
unsustainable exploitation and habitat degradation peril global fish stocks, and therefore 
the natural capital and food source they represent (Pauly et al. 2005, Godfray et al. 
2010). 
In summary, there is substantial wealth generated globally in connection with fish 
and fisheries. At the same time, mismanagement and detrimental utilization put the 
continuity of those resources at risk and squander potential benefits on massive scale 

"Itwillappear,Ihope,thatmostoftheproblemsassociatedwiththewords“conservation”or
“depletion” or “overexploitation” in the fisheries are, in reality,manifestations of the fact,
thatthenaturalresourcesoftheseayieldnoeconomicrent."
H.ScottGordon,1954
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(World Bank 2009). The study of these systems at the intercept point between biology 
and economics is therefore not only of scientific value but embodies high socioeconomic 
relevance. The disciplines of bioeconomics and fisheries management may provide here 
important answers for the problems and challenges to achieve sustainability and 
efficiency. 
EVOLUTION OF FISHERIES ECONOMICS 
From today’s perspective, the sweeping absence of scientific and political debate until 
mid 20th century on the utilization and management of fish stocks may be puzzling. 
However, it illustrates impressively how the way society bears upon the environment and 
natural resources has changed, as well as the scientific progress that has been made in the 
past decades. The levity of previous generations in this matter becomes more 
understandable in view of a vast resource and limited technological possibilities of past 
fishermen. Hence, the fallacy that fishing cannot cause a significant impact on fish stocks 
was common even among biologists. A drastic change in the situation began with large-
scale industrial fisheries after World War II, accentuating the need for a paradigm shift. 
The technological development of fisheries found its echo in several corner stones 
of modern fisheries management published in the same period (Gordon 1954, Schaefer 
1954, Scott 1955, Beverton and Holt 1957). Conceptually, the ideas may be divided into 
a biological approach contrasting the economic perspective: R. Beverton and S. Holt, as 
well as M.B. Schaefer focused on dynamics of exploited stocks while A. Scott’s book 
contained a “then confusing notion of conservation of natural resources in terms of 
stewardship of assets” (Wilen 2000). Gordon on the other hand discussed the problem of 
overexploitation in an open-access resource and thus portended what later became more 
generally known as the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968). Particularly the work 
of Gordon and Schaefer offered with their perceptive simplicity an essential 
understanding of key mechanisms in a fishery – and still do. This is easily underlined by 
the fact that the Gordon-Schaefer model remains until today the pedagogical tool of 
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THEGORDONSCHAEFERMODEL
The GordonSchaefer model (Schaefer 1954,
Tietenberg and Lewis 2008) combines a logistic
growthmodel with simple economic assumptions to
an equilibrium model of a fishery, describing stock
productivity and corresponding fishing effort under
assumption of constant price and constant marginal
cost. Under effort Em biological yield is maximized,
while with Ee the efficient allocation of effort is
achieved (marginal cost = marginal revenue) and
economic rent highest. Without regulation effort is
increased until rent is fully dissipated, i.e. total cost
equals total revenue, defining the open access
situation. Limitations are the simplified stock
dynamics, ignoring ecosystem interactions,
demographicsandgenetics,aswellasfleetdynamics.
 
choice to explain characteristics 
of a common-property resource 
(Tietenberg and Lewis 2008). 
The main achievements of 
the Gordon-Schaefer model are 
the concepts of maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY), 
maximum economic yield (MEY) 
and open-access equilibrium. 
MSY describes the stock size and 
corresponding fishing effort 
where yield is highest, i.e. a 
simple maximization of 
biological productivity. MEY on 
the other hand incorporates 
economics as part of the fishery, 
defining the yield where 
economic rent is maximized. This 
is contrasted by the open-access 
equilibrium, characterized by 
zero economic returns from 
additional harvest and therefore 
full rent dissipation (Gordon 
1954, Gardner et al. 1990).  
Yet, the static framework’s 
disregard for the temporal 
component of resource 
exploitation was cause for some concern, as already Scott had recognized (Scott 1955). 
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Therefore, fisheries economics progressed significantly with the introduction of dynamic 
solutions to the problem of optimal resource utilization and an elaborated capital theory. 
The first model accounting for dynamics dates back to Crutchfield and Zellner (1962), 
concluding, however, little influence on the outcome. This dissented Scott’s notion that 
high discount rates could shift MEY towards the effort level of an open-access situation. 
Consequently, dynamic solutions to fisheries problems were considered to be of little 
relevance (Turvey 1964), even by Scott himself (Christy and Scott 1965). Optimal 
control-theory (Pontryagin et al. 1962) provided here a new powerful tool, but its 
implementation into resource economics towards the end of the decade was viewed as 
mere complication (Munro 1992). It was mainly C.W. Clark who caused a paradigm 
shift as he demonstrated the impact of dynamic solutions: Effort yielding MEY can 
surpass MSY-effort (Clark 1971) and the difference between discount rate and intrinsic 
growth rate can affect optimal harvest strategies (Clark 1973). Based on this, Clark 
highlighted the peculiarity of fish stocks as natural capital (Clark and Munro 1975). 
Collecting those threads, “Mathematical bioeconomics” (Clark 1976) proved itself as a 
seminal work that provided strong argument for the interdisciplinarity of fisheries 
science. In spite of the more recent scientific and political advancements (Wilen 2000, 
Bjørndal et al. 2007, Clark 2010), the basic principles and questions remained rather 
perpetual. Foremost the quest for MEY is still the dominating thread for fisheries 
economists (Grafton et al. 2007, Dichmont et al. 2010). 
CURRENT STATUS AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
The conclusive and aging theoretic directives to optimal resource utilization are 
contrasted by prevalent management failure in reality as well as a poor state of the 
world’s fisheries and marine resources today (Jackson 2008, Holt 2009, World Bank 
2009, FAO 2011). Renowned fisheries scientists draw a bleak picture, attesting a trophic 
down-fishing (Pauly et al. 1998), “worldwide crisis in fisheries” (Clark 2006a), the 
collapse of all fisheries in near future (Worm et al. 2006) and ultimately the “end of fish” 
(Pauly 2009). These assessment are not unchallenged (Murawski et al. 2007, Branch 
  
15
INDIVIDUALTRANSFERABLEQUOTAS
Individual transferable quotas are one type of
dedicated access rights, distributing total allowable
catches (TAC) as quota shares to private individuals
(Squiresetal.1995,Grafton1996,Branchetal.2006).
Thequotashareisfullytransferableandcantherefore
betraded.FirstdescribedbyF.T.Christy (1973), ITQs
remained a theoretical concept for almost two
decades until first implementations in Icelandic and
New Zealand fisheries (Sissenwine and Mace 1992,
Annala 1996, Arnason 1996). Since then they gained
increasingacceptanceasamanagementtool.Thekey
advantage of ITQs is their transferability: More
efficient fishermen can buy quota shares from less
efficientfishermen.Thisresultsinaoverallincreaseof
economicefficiencyinthefishery.Additionally,future
rents promote stewardship for the fish stock among
the quota owners. But there is a downside to both
points:Quotatradingcanleadtomonopolization,and
potentiallyhugeincreasesinvaluesraisequestionsof
social equity (Clark 2006a). In particular, critics point
out that free endowment of fishermen and lack of
temporal restrictions can lead to substantial private
profits from a public good (Macinko and Bromley
2003). ITQs also do not guarantee biological
sustainability,butgeneratesolelyeconomicefficiency.
ThereforesuccessfulITQmanagementstillreliesonan
adequate TAC and strict enforcement of quota and
gearrestrictions.
2008, Daan et al. 2011, Hilborn 
2011), and recent studies come 
to more complex conclusions 
(Dankel et al. 2008, Mora et al. 
2009, Worm et al. 2009). In 
particular, there are widespread 
counterexamples of successful 
management (Beddington et al. 
2007, Hilborn 2007a, c, Costello 
et al. 2008). Furthermore, flawed 
conclusion based on unclear 
objectives (Hilborn 2007d), 
arbitrary reference points 
(Hilborn and Stokes 2010) or 
inconclusive catch data (De 
Mutsert et al. 2008, Branch et al. 
2010) require consideration. 
Nonetheless, the overall 
performance of global fisheries 
is mediocre at best, raising the 
question: What went wrong?  
The reasons for 
overfishing, unsustainable 
practices and economic 
underperformance are diverse 
and rarely straight-forward. 
From an economic perspective, 
the problems in fisheries 
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originate in market failures connected to deficient property rights, quota system designs, 
user conflicts or insufficient enforcement (Clark 2006b, Grafton et al. 2008). Thus, a 
common symptom of fisheries mismanagement is overcapitalization, often caused by 
subsidies (Munro and Sumaila 2001, Clark et al. 2005, Sumaila et al. 2008, Sumaila et 
al. 2010). This problem is strongly linked to unsustainable total allowable catches 
(TACs) due to political decisions instead of scientific advice (Pauly, et al. 2002). Catch 
restrictions are further undermined by illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
activities, particularly in absence of an adequate legal framework or sufficient 
enforcement (Gallic and Cox 2006, Sumaila et al. 2006, Agnew et al. 2009)  
A key role in overfishing and rent dissipation can be attributed to improper access, 
property and use rights (Schlager and Ostrom 1992, Scott 2008). Hence, fishermen 
behaviour and fleet dynamics are a crucial factor (Branch, et al. 2006). However, 
previous quota systems often provided improper incentives and therefore failed in reality 
(Hilborn et al. 2005, Clark 2006a): A race-to-fish, high-grading and discarding as some 
of the most notable unwanted effects of unsound quota system designs (Pascoe 1997, 
Sutinen 1999, Hilborn 2007b). A potential cause is the prevalent management focus on 
biological reference points and the health of fish stocks, disregarding economic 
objectives as driving force of fisheries (Wilen 2000, Hilborn 2002, Branch, et al. 2006). 
Yet economic factors are from society’s viewpoint a key purpose of fisheries and 
demand adequate attention in fisheries management. In this context, catch shares in form 
of individual fishing quotas (IFQs) or individual transferable quotas (ITQs) gain 
increasing acceptance as potential remedy (Squires, et al. 1995, Grafton 1996, Grafton et 
al. 2006). Signs of success substantiate this notion (Chu 2009, Costello et al. 2010), 
although a cautious implementation is required (Bromley 2009, Grafton et al. 2009, 
Gibbs 2010, Sumaila 2010), and the appropriate choice of management instruments 
depend on specific situations and challenges (Kompas et al. 2008, Hannesson 2011). 
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ALTERNATIVE USES AND ECOSYSTEM BENEFITS 
The direct benefits from commercial fisheries are supplemented by alternative use values 
and non-use values of fish, frequently leading to stakeholder conflicts over the resources. 
Particularly recreational fishing generates substantial benefits (Connelly and Brown 
1991, Pitcher and Hollingworth 2002), but may also contribute to stock depletion (Post 
et al. 2002, Coleman et al. 2004, Cooke and Cowx 2004) and is commonly understudied. 
Furthermore, recreational fishing is connected to benefits through tourism, and therefore 
relates to non-consumptive use values of aquatic systems and the ecosystem services 
they provide (Costanza 1997). 
Ecological economics define ecosystem services as a flow of energy, information 
and material from natural capital within ecosystems to the benefit of human welfare 
(Costanza 1997, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). This includes direct and 
indirect use and non-use values, ranging from food production and recreational purposes 
to climate regulation, pollution control or sediment retention. Commonly markets 
captures these services only partially or not all, and quantitative valuation is often 
difficult. In fisheries management some ecosystem approaches attempt to account for 
additional ecosystem services, but globally most policies focus solely on (single) fish 
stocks as food source. Here integration of ecological economics and alternative 
stakeholder interests could result in improved sustainability and alignment of objectives 
as part of a “new consensus” (Hilborn 2007). 
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THE BIOLOGY BEHIND ECONOMICS 
FISH STOCKS AS BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
As fisheries biologists tend to underestimate the economic complexity of a fishery, so are 
fish rarely grasped as the biological entities they are in fisheries economics. Fish stocks 
are subpopulations of a fish species, and therefore subject to population dynamics and 
demographics. Furthermore, a fish stock exists in an ecological and evolutionary context, 
including all biological interactions in the framework of an ecosystem, as well as the 
underlying environmental determinants. The resulting inherent complexity of a fish stock 
elevates it above more trivial resources. Consequently, harvesting fish involves much 
more than a mere removal of biomass as economic models traditionally suggest. Thus, 
simplifications of low-dimensional lumped-biomass models could be a reason for 
unsatisfactory management results (Krysiak and Krysiak 2002, Tahvonen 2008). 
IMPACT OF FISHING 
Fishing imposes additional mortality on a fish stock, commonly enhanced by size 
selectivity, and alters the demographic composition of the stock. Truncations of size 
structure may impair the recruitment potential of fish stocks (Murawski et al. 2001, 
Berkeley et al. 2004b), destabilize population dynamics (Anderson et al. 2008) and 
increase population variability (Longhurst 2002, Hsieh et al. 2006) as well as natural 
mortality (Jørgensen and Fiksen 2010). This generally results in reduced productivity of 
fish stocks and higher vulnerability towards environmental changes and fluctuations. 
These dynamics feedbacks could be particularly problematic in view of potential threats 
through climatic changes (Perry et al. 2005, Brander 2007).  
Reduced stock densities are another major factor to take into account in harvested 
populations. Density-dependence in larval and juvenile survival is commonly 

"I think themajor opposition to ecology has deeper roots thanmere economics; ecology
threatenswidelyheldvaluessofundamentalthattheymustbecalledreligious"
GarrettHardin,1982
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acknowledged as an essential part of population dynamics in fish (Rothschild 1986, 
Hilborn and Walters 1992, Houde 1994, Cowan et al. 2000). This is extensively 
implemented in most stock assessment models as density-dependent recruitment, i.e. a 
spawning stock-recruitment relationship, and long established in fisheries science 
(Ricker 1946, Beverton and Holt 1957). In comparison, density-dependent individual 
growth among recruited fishes has received little attention, despite evidence for its 
relevance in the regulation of fish stocks (Jenkins Jr et al. 1999, Lorenzen and Enberg 
2002, Vincenzi et al. 2008) and its potential management implications (Helser and 
Brodziak 1998). In general, density-dependence results in increased growth potentials 
under low densities and may reinforce resilience of fish stocks towards fishing mortality. 
There is increasing evidence that fishing may cause evolutionary changes (Law 
and Grey 1989, Conover and Munch 2002, Jørgensen et al. 2007, Law 2007, Hutchings 
and Fraser 2008, Allendorf and Hard 2009). Fishing mortality reduces the overall chance 
of survival and imposes a shift in the selection landscape of life-history traits. The 
mechanism and resulting adaptations have been documented in time-series analysis 
(Ricker 1981, Heino et al. 2002, Swain et al. 2007), experimental (Reznick and 
Ghalambor 2005, Conover et al. 2009, Conover and Baumann 2009) and modelling 
approaches (Ernande et al. 2004, Dunlop et al. 2009b). Today most commercial fish 
stocks are heavily exploited (Worm, et al. 2009, FAO 2011), fishing mortalities may 
therefore outnumber natural mortalities significantly (Mertz and Myers 1998) and cause 
rapid evolution (Darimont et al. 2009). Potential negative consequences for biomass and 
yield (Law and Grey 1989, Conover and Munch 2002), adult body size (Heino 1998, 
Enberg et al. 2011) or the recovery of depleted fish stock (Enberg et al. 2009) are 
contrasted by indications for heightened resilience towards fishing pressure (Enberg, et 
al. 2009, Enberg et al. 2010). 
As ecosystems are subject to fluctuations and changes up to drastic regime shifts 
(Scheffer and Carpenter 2003, Mayer and Rietkerk 2004, Carpenter et al. 2008), fishing 
has been suggested as an indirect or direct cause for trophic shifts and ecological 
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transitions (Jackson et al. 2001, Folke et al. 2004). In particular, predominant targeting of 
large predatory species and overfishing may cause cascading effects on the food web and 
result in alternative trophic regimes (Scheffer et al. 2005, Daskalov et al. 2007, 
Österblom et al. 2007, Casini et al. 2009). This corresponds with an observed decrease of 
mean trophic level of catches that indicates a dwindling of high-trophic level fisheries 
and increasing exploitation of lower trophic levels (Pauly, et al. 1998, Pauly and 
Palomares 2005, Essington et al. 2006, Branch, et al. 2010). It has been shown that this 
could create alternative stable states (Persson et al. 2007). 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The complexity of marine ecosystems with multi-layered feedbacks to fishing reveals 
another major reason for failing fisheries. Correspondingly, the comprehensive 
understanding of the underlying biological system is a crucial component of successful 
fisheries management. But in reality most approaches are still rather simplistic. 
Traditionally, management efforts target on concepts like MSY (Larkin 1977) and 
preventing growth or recruitment overfishing (Beverton and Holt 1957, Sissenwine 
1987, Myers et al. 1994). The corresponding biological reference points (Gabriel and 
Mace 1999) and size limits remain therefore predominant. However, the crude single-
species perspective neglects evolutionary and plastic consequences as well as the 
ecosystem point of view. 
The proportion of big individuals in a population could be one major parameter 
for improved sustainability (Berkeley, et al. 2004b, Birkeland and Dayton 2005). This 
idea is based upon the avoidance of recruitment overfishing, but links to concerns of 
growth overfishing too. The concept of growth overfishing dates back to Beverton and 
Holt (1957) who pointed out the relevance of age structure and the growth of 
corresponding cohorts. When individuals of a cohort are allowed to grow sufficiently, 
the resulting yield per recruit is optimized and a biologically efficient harvest is 
achieved. More recent studies add the additional dimension of maternal effects. There is 
evidence for higher larval survival of older female spawners (Berkeley et al. 2004a) with 
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impacts on lifetime reproduction (O'Farrell and Botsford 2006). Here, considering 
individual growth and age-dependent effects can therefore not only maximize the 
harvested yield from a cohort, but increase recruitment and overall population stability 
(Murawski 2000, Anderson, et al. 2008). Thus, several threads of evidence suggest that 
taking into account age structure and individual size may be crucial parameters to 
determine optimal sustainable harvest (Tahvonen 2008, Diekert et al. 2010). 
The potential impact of fishing-induced evolutionary changes is a similar 
management concern (Heino 1998, Ashley et al. 2003, Jørgensen, et al. 2007, Dunlop et 
al. 2009a). As fishing has the ability to affect the evolution of life-history traits, 
consequences for the biomass of fish stocks and their resilience towards environmental 
change are likely, ultimately derogating sustainable yields of fisheries. Because 
evolutionary changes may be difficult or even impossible to reverse (De Roos et al. 
2006), a careful assessment of evolutionary impacts and their mitigation with 
evolutionary sensitive reference points is necessary (Hutchings 2009). 
The ecosystem perspective of fisheries management has gained much attention 
recently (Pikitch et al. 2004, Garcia and Cochrane 2005). In spite of the fast 
dissemination of the term itself, including FAO guidelines and others, the concept 
remained rather vague. Generally, ecosystem-approaches to fisheries imply a holistic 
perspective and aim for by-catch mitigation, multi-species management, avoidance of 
ecosystem degradation or integrated approaches (Morishita 2008). Hence, single-species 
stock assessments and reference points need to be replaced by appropriate metrics and 
management goals (Brodziak and Link 2002, Hall and Mainprize 2004, Jennings 2005). 
However, scientific progress and partial implementations initiated a potential paradigm 
shift (Murawski 2007). 
In general, the management instruments to address biological challenges are 
limited. Specific management questions may obscure that the underlying mechanisms are 
restricted to gear selectivity and – overall, spatial or temporal – reductions of fishing 
mortality. Because gear selectivity is imperfect and very limited in some fisheries, e.g. 
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purse-seining, fishing mortality becomes often the only biological lever of regulatory 
control. At the same time, overfishing is the key driver of unsustainable fisheries, stock 
collapse and evolutionary or ecological changes. Accordingly, lowered fishing pressure 
can be considered as straight-forward remedy, addressing all described problems to some 
degree. Two threads take this up in particular: Precautionary approach and marine 
protected areas (MPAs). The precautionary approach focuses on uncertainty directly, 
using risk-minimizing reference points to ensure long-term sustainability (Garcia 1996, 
Hilborn et al. 2001). Similarly, MPAs attempt to mitigate uncertainties, consolidate stock 
productivity and resilience and reduce ecosystem impacts with no-take zones (Sumaila et 
al. 2000, Grafton et al. 2005, Edgar et al. 2007).  
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BIOECONOMIC SYNTHESIS 
In view of the biological and socio-economic dynamics of fisheries, it becomes clear that 
only an interdisciplinary approach enables successful management. Bridging the gap, 
bioeconomics provide a crucial discipline to achieve the goal of sustainable, yet 
profitable fisheries and marine ecosystems (Hannesson 1993, Anderson and Seijo 2010, 
Clark 2010). In this respect, bioeconomic models are a useful tool to combine stock and 
fleet dynamics, balance biological precaution with economic efficiency, and generate 
comprehensive policy advice. However, implementing theory in practice has its pitfalls. 
In particular, adequate complexity in biological and economic parameters is crucial, or as 
in the canonical saying, models should be as simple as possible, but as sophisticated as 
necessary. Hence, to reach this goal while balancing the different perspectives 
summarizes the key challenge of bioeconomic models. It comes as no surprise that the 
previously described discipline biases, i.e. lack of biological or economic insight, 
respectively, is a key problem. To unify the different perspectives and explore potentially 
relevant mechanisms at the boundary of biology and economics is therefore crucial for 
successful bioeconomics. The research in the framework of this thesis was conducted in 
this spirit.  

"The current state of affairs, in which most professional economists ignore resource
limitations and inwhichmost ecologistsmaintain a proud disdain of economics,must give
way to a science of renewable resource management based on sound principles of
bioeconomics."
ColinW.Clark,1989
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THESIS APPROACH 
RESEARCH RATIONALE 
To this point I discussed the biological and economic complexities of fisheries 
management, highlighting the need for integral bioeconomic research that combines both 
perspectives. This represents the root idea of this thesis: The basic quest throughout to 
bring more biology into economic questions and vice-versa, and thereby to improve 
utilization of fish stocks. In detail, the general research questions are: 
 What is the value of body size? 
 What is the economic impact of fishing-induced evolution? 
The first question (paper I, II, III) ties in with the topic of growth overfishing 
and general importance of size-structure for fisheries. With a focus on size-dependent 
pricing, we emphasise the intrinsic economic value of body size directly. Thus, we 
provide a change of perspective with this previously understudied topic and underline 
the overall relevance of body size for fisheries. The second problem (paper IV) centres 
on potential evolutionary consequences of fishing by amending previous research with 
an economic assessment. This offers a first evaluation of possible evolutionary cost, and 
introduces at the same time an evolutionary dimension into fisheries economics. 
THE VALUE OF SIZE 
Individual growth has been long established as a key parameter in population dynamics 
of fish, and therefore also the prevention of growth overfishing for fisheries management 
(Beverton and Holt 1957). More recent studies corroborate the biological relevance of 
stock structure in context of survival and reproductive success further (Murawski, et al. 
2001, Berkeley, et al. 2004b, Birkeland and Dayton 2005). Similarly, age and size 
structure are increasingly acknowledged as crucial factor for harvest optimization 
(Tahvonen 2008, 2009, Diekert, et al. 2010). However, another aspect has drawn little 
attention: The intrinsic economic value of body size, or size-dependent pricing.  
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It is common that ex-vessel prices for fish are weight-structured with increasing 
prices per weight unit for larger individuals. Simply speaking, big fish often fetch higher 
relative prices than smaller one. Correspondingly, an influence of size-dependent pricing 
on optimal harvest strategies has been suggested for a long time (Hilborn and Walters 
1992). Yet just a few studies regarded this aspect to some extent (Gallagher et al. 2004, 
Holland et al. 2005, Tahvonen 2009). More frequently, size-dependent pricing was 
considered as a fixed component of fisheries without further analysis (e.g.Helser et al. 
1996, De Leo and Gatto 2001, Katsukawa 2005). Therefore the goal was to fill this gap 
and demonstrate in two different approaches the influence of size-dependent pricing on 
optimal harvesting, as well as assess its prevalence in Norwegian fisheries. This involved 
quantifications in the framework of age-structured models (paper I) as well as an 
analytical approach (paper II) and a statistical analysis (paper III).  
Paper I uses Atlantic herring (Clupea harengus) and Atlantic mackerel (Scomber 
scombrus) as example fisheries for the influence of size-dependent pricing on optimal 
fishing mortalities and resulting net present value (NPV). We use age-structured 
population models with size-dependent harvesting, and apply a price function based on a 
linear approximation of Norwegian price per weight class data (paper III) to allow for a 
smooth variation of the size-price relationship. This quantifies how size-dependent 
pricing may alter optimal fishing mortalities, and the resulting mean catch weight and 
NPV.  
Paper II combines fishing-induced truncations of size structure with size-
dependent pricing to study the consequences of size-dependent effects on sustainable 
rent and harvest paths. To permit an analytical approach we chose a lumped-biomass 
model, extended with relationships between fishing effort and mean individual size as 
well as size and price. This enables us to trace on a generic level how size-dependent 
effects change optimal harvest paths and sustainable rent. 
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Paper III contains an analysis of price data from Norwegian fisheries in respect 
to size dependence. This takes up the point of origin in paper I, but uses instead 
statistical methods to determine the overall prevalence and strength of size-dependent 
pricing in Norwegian fisheries. Because all previous work in this topic was mostly 
conceptual or restricted to mere case studies, paper III offers a first systematic 
approach. Moreover, it underlines the key assumption of paper I and II and therefore 
their conclusions. 
Both modelling approaches conclude a reduction of optimal effort or fishing 
mortality under consideration of size structure and size-dependent pricing. This suggests 
that ignoring body size could lead to flawed strategies to achieve MEY, potentially 
causing rent dissipation and suboptimal performance of fisheries. From our results it 
follows that the impact of fishing on stock demographics and size-structured market 
prices should receive more attention in bioeconomic modelling and management 
policies. 
THE COST OF EVOLUTION 
As evidences for evolutionary consequences of fishing have been substantiated (e.g. 
Conover and Munch 2002, Law 2007, Hutchings and Fraser 2008, Allendorf and Hard 
2009), the debate has shifted towards possible management implications of fishing-
induced evolution (FIE) (Jørgensen, et al. 2007, Dunlop, et al. 2009a, Hutchings 2009). 
In summary, there is concern that FIE may impair stock biomass, stability and recovery 
potential, and therefore result in negative consequences for fisheries, particularly reduced 
yield and higher vulnerability to environmental change. However, existing work is 
mainly focused on biological consequences of FIE for fish stocks, their conclusiveness 
and adequate management response. On the other hand, there was little attention for the 
economic perspective, in spite of its crucial role for fisheries. Therefore, in paper IV we 
contribute an evaluation of potential economic impacts of FIE. 
Our study contains a basic quantification of the economic impact FIE might have. 
In doing so, we extend traditional bioeconomic models not only with dynamics of a 
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structured population, but with trait variation as well. Changeable traits have been rarely 
part of bioeconomic studies; therefore our approach includes general novelty in this 
context. In paper IV we compare an age-structured population dynamics model with 
evolutionary life-history to the same model with fixed traits. Maturation age acts as the 
only evolving trait in a key role and affects here growth, reproduction and survival 
directly, and is genetically inherited. Natural mortality and fishing are size-dependent 
and act as selective force. Additionally, the input parameters of fishing, size-selectivity 
and maximum fishing mortality, determine the catch and corresponding economic 
output. The parameterization is adjusted to the stock of Northeast Arctic cod (Gadus 
morhua). 
The model shows a clear long-term impact of fishing-induced evolution on 
economic rent. However, the quantitative influence is generally rather insignificant. In 
particular, the differences between optimal fishing mortality and resulting MEY are low 
even under assumption of low discount rates. With higher discount rates, the effect of 
FIE becomes even negligible. Furthermore, in our model the fish stock demonstrates a 
higher resilience towards overfishing with FIE, pointing out potential advantages 
through evolutionary adaptation in specific situations. Our results predict also an 
evolutionary shift in size composition of stock and catch. This may be a concern in 
context of general fishing-induced changes in stock structure and consolidate related 
negative effects like reduced productivity and population stability on a genetic level. In 
economic terms, consequences of FIE could be enhanced when considering the value of 
size. Therefore a future extension of the model with size-dependent pricing is likely to 
predict more pronounced economic consequences.  
The influence of discounting on the economic relevance of FIE underlines a 
problematic aspect with dynamic solutions to problems of optimal resource utilization. 
Traditionally, reasonable low discount rates, e.g. a social discount rate, demonstrated 
little influence on optimal harvest of fish stocks. However, precondition is a sufficient 
difference of magnitude between discount rate and intrinsic growth rate. Otherwise, 
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optimal economic harvest can shift to levels higher than MSY or even suggest extinction 
(Clark 1973). Similarly, even high rates of human-induced evolutionary change are 
rather subtle and slow from a fisheries perspective. Therefore, as we have shown in 
paper IV, economic impacts of FIE may be very sensitive to choice of discount rate. 
This implies that FIE is for fisheries economics and in view of overall uncertainty rather 
irrelevant. Yet it appears ethically problematic to diminish the productivity of a fish 
stock for future generations, which raises the question if a conventional approach can do 
justice to such intergenerational problems (Lande et al. 1994, Weitzman 1998, 
Ainsworth and Sumaila 2005). This transcends to usage of natural resources and impact 
of environmental changes in general, and will require future research and debate. In 
particular, alternative concepts of discounting like e.g. decreasing discount rate over time 
await further exploration. 
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